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Abstract. We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of
events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively diﬃ-
cult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion has also pervaded
a substantial amount of economic literature.
Undescribable events in our model are understood by economic agents —
their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every ﬁnite
description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a
non-negligible impact on the parties’ expected utilities.
We illustrate our results using a simple coinsurance problem as a backdrop.
When the only uncertainty faced by the two agents is an undescribable event
the optimal ﬁnite coinsurance contract is no contract at all.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In the well known case of Jacobellis v. Ohio,1 Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
argued that only “hard-core” pornography could be banned, but conceded:
“I shall not today attempt to further deﬁne the kind of materials I under-
stand to be embraced within the shorthand deﬁnition; and perhaps I could
never succeed in doing so,” Stewart had said. “But I know it when I see
it.” (Woodward and Armstrong 1979, p. 94)
The describability problem faced by Justice Potter Stewart exempliﬁes well the
type of circumstances we focus on in this paper: We seldom observe exhaustive ex-
ante rules, even though formulating such rules carries potentially enormous beneﬁts.2
Consider the following familiar example. Academic institutions routinely decide
whether to grant tenure to junior faculty members. An ex-ante contingent tenure
rule would spell out in advance a detailed set of conditions under which tenure would
be granted as a function of a candidate’s performance. Formulating such rule would
entail considerable gains, such as reducing uncertainty, cutting down on the eﬀort
and resources spent in committee work, and reducing the potential for allegations of
inequity, bias, etc. Despite this, to our knowledge no research-oriented department in
the United States has set forth such rule. Instead, decisions are usually made using a
lengthy case-by-case process that often suﬀers from the drawbacks mentioned above.
The thesis of this paper is that complete contingent contracting on something like
the tenure decision is diﬃcult because the underlying event, “the candidate has a
tenurable vita,” is inherently hard to describe ex-ante in its full details.
What we call “undescribability” is a pervasive force in economic interactions. This
is often noted in the context of contracting (although the quote form Justice Stewart
1Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 (1964).
2These comprise not only the savings on litigation and court costs, but include also the beneﬁts
from the disincentives to “manipulative” behavior which non-exhaustive deﬁnitions may generate.
The analysis of the strategic impact of the lack of exhaustive ex-ante rules, while clearly important,
is beyond the scope of our analysis here.Undescribable Events 2
illustrates that the issue extends well beyond contracting narrowly construed). In
their seminal paper, Grossman and Hart note:
“A basic assumption of the model is that the production decisions are
suﬃciently complex that they cannot be speciﬁed completely in an initial
contract between the ﬁrms. We have in mind a situation in which it is
prohibitively diﬃcult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance
how all the potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should
be chosen as a function of the many states of the world. (Grossman and
Hart 1986, p. 696)
This paper introduces a model that admits complex events. What would such
events look like? In the tenure example, it is easy to write simple, clear-cut rules
like “grant tenure if and only if the candidate publishes x or more papers in journal
y.” The problem is that such a rule is too coarse to capture the subtle ways in
which membership in the event “the candidate has a tenurable vita” is determined
as a function of observable characteristics of a candidate’s record. The probability
that the candidate will get tenure may even be one if enough papers are published.
However for some values of x and y in the sentence above the probability of promotion
will be neither zero nor one.3
In our model all ex-ante descriptions are feasible, provided only they are ﬁnite in
a well deﬁned sense. Roughly speaking, an event is complex if any feasible ex-ante
description will leave a “positive measure” of exceptions. In a benchmark extreme
we consider below, these exceptions are so pervasive that no contract is written in
equilibrium. In intermediate cases, the best contract the parties can come up with
may be of value but still falls short of fully delineating the boundaries of the event to
be contracted on.
Our framework can be viewed as a limit of large ﬁnite environments with slight
imperfections (e.g. small contracting cost).4 An advantage of the abstract limit model
3We return to this example extensively in Subsection 8.2 below.
4We do not report a formal version of this claim here in the interest of brevity.Undescribable Events 3
we consider is that complexity takes the very sharp form of a discontinuity between
the ex-ante problem of ﬁnding a ﬁnite description of the relevant events and the ex-
post evidence available to the decision makers. While Justice Stewart conceded that
the problem of formulating an ex-ante deﬁnition of pornography is diﬃcult, he was
equally emphatic in asserting that when facing a speciﬁc event, “I know it when I see
it.” In the tenure example, this amounts to saying that ex-post, when facing a speciﬁc
case, a tenure committee “knows” a tenurable vitae “when they see it.”5 In this paper
we develop a model in which the contracting parties ﬁnd it impossible to convey their
will to the enforcement agent (the court) by means of a ﬁnite description (contract)
even though the event they would like to condition on is common knowledge among
them.
1.2. Desiderata
We proceed with a list of critical requirements that we seek for our model of unde-
scribable events.
1. Expected Utility. We want a model in which the consequences and probabili-
ties of the relevant events are understood by the parties, and hence all appropriate
expected utility calculations can be carried out.
2. Language Based. We want to take seriously the notion that we can distinguish
between physical states and their description in ex-ante agreements.6
To capture this requirement, we work with a model in which physical states of
nature can be described by means of a language in which a countable inﬁnity of ele-
mentary statements are possible. Each elementary statement represents a particular
feature that can be either present or not in a given state of nature (the sky can be
either “blue” or “not blue”).
5For the time being, we ignore the issue of a possible ex-post implementation mechanism (Moore
and Repullo 1988, Maskin and Tirole 1999). We revisit this question in Section 9 below when we
discuss some related literature.
6Of course this does not preclude, as will be the case in our model below, that a “full description”
of a state of nature will identify the actual state uniquely.Undescribable Events 4
So, with little loss of generality, we take each physical state of nature s ∈ S to
be fully described by an inﬁnite list of elementary statements {s1,...,si,...} that
determine which features are present in the state. Each feature si can either be
present (si = 1) or not (si = 0) in each state so that S is a subset of C = {0,1}N, the
set of all inﬁnite sequences of 0s and 1s.7
3. Rich Language. We model events that are undescribable because they are too
complex, and not because the contracting parties are endowed with a language that
is simply too coarse relative to the environment they face. Since we want to rule out
coarse languages, as a minimal requirement we will insist that the parties can write
ex-ante contracts that vary across any two states s0 and s00.
4. Finitely Describable Events. The set of statements that can be included in an
ex-ante contract must embody the notion that there are in fact some events that are
“[...] prohibitively diﬃcult to [...] describe unambiguously in advance” (Grossman
and Hart 1986, p. 696). Given that we require that our model be language-based
in the sense above, there is a completely natural way to model this notion. We will
assume that only ﬁnite statements about the constituent features of a set of states
can be included in the contract that the parties draw up.
1.3. Modeling Choices
The complexity-based approach we advocate markedly departs from alternative plau-
sible explanations based on irrationality, contract-writing costs and non-veriﬁability
7We limit the set of elementary statements to be at most countably inﬁnite, in keeping with the
view that in any logical endeavor a “statement” must be a ﬁnite string of symbols drawn from an
alphabet that is itself at most countably inﬁnite. Of course, depending on the cardinality of S a
ﬁnite set of elementary statements could suﬃce to pin down a state uniquely. In this case S would
have to be a ﬁnite set. The actual assumption embodied in our statement above is that a countable
inﬁnity of elementary statements is in fact always suﬃcient to uniquely identify a state s. This
implies that the cardinality of S is at most 2ℵ0.
This is also an appropriate point to observe that our “ambient space” C can be thought of as the
Cantor set. To think of our set-up in this way lends it considerable more generality and may equip
some readers with a useful way to picture the structure of the model. For reasons of space we do
not pursue this interpretation any further in our analysis below. We are nevertheless grateful to an
anonymous referee for raising this point.Undescribable Events 5
that have been explored in earlier works. An obvious question is what a complexity-
based explanation adds to these other approaches. Although we narrowly focus on the
role of complexity to the exclusion of other considerations, this should be understood
as an expository device to make our point as sharply as possible. A satisfactory ex-
planation of undescribability is likely to involve a combination of factors, some others
of which we brieﬂy discuss below.
1. Irrationality. It is easy to generate undescribable events by appealing to some
form of irrationality. For instance, one may assume that the agents do not understand
the model or that they are not sophisticated enough to incorporate probabilities
in their decision processes. This is not what we do here. Agents in our model
are rational: they understand the consequences and probabilities associated with a
particular event; they can evaluate expected payoﬀs from their actions, including the
contracts they sign. The main restriction we impose on agents’ abilities is that they
are limited to ex-ante contracts that are ﬁnite. We do not view this as a form of
irrationality, but rather as a rational response to a formidably complex environment.
2. Contracting Costs. One way to generate undescribable events is to introduce
explicitly costs of writing ﬁner and ﬁner contracts. At an intuitive level, this explana-
tion appears quite compelling.8 Writing costs seem to be an undeniable feature of real
world contracting problems. However, a critical trade-oﬀ arises in formally modeling
this idea. Clearly, any suﬃciently large cost function delivers ex-ante contracts that
are necessarily coarser than the ﬁrst best (in the absence of such costs). But the form
of undescribability (i.e., which events are describable and which are not) will depend
on the assumed form of the cost function, an exercise which, at least to some degree,
is necessarily arbitrary. The other side of the trade-oﬀ of course is that if one is able
to trust the cost function that is postulated, a tighter characterization of equilibrium
contracts will in general be available.
Using exclusively the restriction that contracts be ﬁnite has a further advantage
which manifests itself in two related ways.
8This approach was ﬁrst proposed by Dye (1985), and more recently pursued by Anderlini and
Felli (1999) and Battigalli and Maggi (2002).Undescribable Events 6
First, unlike the results that can be obtained associating a higher cost to “longer
sentences,” our results below are immune to changes in the language that, for instance,
recode two elementary statements into a single one. A ﬁnite statement in one language
will correspond to a ﬁnite statement in the new one and vice-versa. This immunity to
recoding is relevant in a world in which languages evolve to capture more eﬃciently
concepts that may once have been considered complex or diﬃcult.
Second, one may want to consider the possibility that an undescribable event can
itself become an elementary statement in the language; perhaps as a result of evo-
lutionary pressure, or un-modeled “intuition.” Although, depending on the context,
this may or may not be plausible, our results are also immune to this phenomenon.
Once the undescribable event is added to the language as an elementary statement,
a new language is in place. If we now restrict contracts to ﬁnite sentences in the new
language, a new set of undescribable events will arise.
3. Observable but Not Veriﬁable Events. The contracting literature has identiﬁed
another type of circumstance in which failure to condition on some events may arise.
These are events that are “observable but not veriﬁable.”9 In this framework, whether
the relevant event occurs or not is observed by (and is common knowledge among)
the contracting parties. The problem is that whether the event has occurred or not
cannot be observed by a third party. In particular, it cannot be veriﬁed by any third
party that is charged with enforcing the terms of the contract (e.g. a court).
Our approach is consistent with, and in fact complements, the observable but
not veriﬁable story. In order for complete ex-ante contracting to take place, two key
ingredients are necessary. The parties need to describe at an ex-ante stage their will
to the court with full precision, and the court needs to be able to verify ex-post
in which category speciﬁed by the contract the actual state of the world falls. The
observable but not veriﬁable approach takes away the court’s ability to verify ex-post
what really took place. In this paper, we model the diﬃculties (impossibility) that
9An exhaustive list of references here would be enormous and hence out of place. See, for instance,
Holmstr¨ om (1982) in which to our knowledge the term was ﬁrst used in its current sense, the seminal
paper by Hart and Moore (1988), and the survey by Tirole (1999).Undescribable Events 7
the contracting parties face in describing their will to the court, leaving intact its
ability to verify the realized state of the world ex-post.
In a fully speciﬁed model of what courts do, it surely would have to be the case
that their information structure is (at least to some extent) endogenous. If the abil-
ity to verify ﬁner and ﬁner events yields large potential gains from trade, then the
appropriate resources will be invested to endow the court with the ability to do so.
The model we develop here tells us that, even in the limit case in which the court
can verify all events, the possibility is still open that the parties will lack the ability
to describe them fully in their contractual agreement.
2. Overview
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 3 we set up the coinsurance
problem we use as a backdrop and derive the benchmark eﬃcient allocation that the
parties can achieve in the absence of any constraint. We then deﬁne the state space
and the associated probability measure in Section 4. In Section 5 we proceed to give
a formal deﬁnition of the notion of a ﬁnite contract. In Section 6 we piece together
all these elements and proceed to evaluate the parties’ expected utilities associated
with any ﬁnite contract. Section 7 presents our ﬁrst main result: the existence of
undescribable events in our model. In Section 8 we return to our basic coinsurance
problem and characterize the eﬀects of undescribable events in this set-up. We show
that when the only uncertainty that the parties face is an undescribable event the
optimal ﬁnite contract is to specify no transfers at all: the no-contract outcome
obtains. In Section 9 we return to some of the related papers we have mentioned above
and expand our discussion of related literature. Section 10 outlines some extensions
of our model and concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.10
10In the numbering of equations, deﬁnitions, remarks and so on, a preﬁx of “A” indicates that the
relevant item is to be found in the Appendix.Undescribable Events 8
3. The Contracting problem
For the sake of concreteness, throughout the paper we work using a standard coin-
surance problem as a backdrop. Two risk-averse agents, labeled i = 1,2 face a risk-
sharing problem. The uncertainty in the environment is captured by the realization
of a state of nature, denoted by s; the set of all possible states of nature is denoted by
S. The preferences of agent i are represented by the state-dependent utility function
Ui : R×S → R. The agents’ utilities depend on s according to whether or not s falls
in a subset Z of the state space S.
The two agents can agree to a state-contingent monetary transfer t ∈ R, which by
convention represents a payment from 2 to 1. Let V : R → R be a twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing and concave function. We write the utility of i = 1,2 in state s, if
the transfer is t as
U1(t,s) =
(
V (1 + t) if s ∈ Z
V (t) if s ∈ Z
U2(t,s) =
(
V (−t) if s ∈ Z
V (1 − t) if s ∈ Z
(1)
where Z denotes the complement of Z in S.
Ex-ante, 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract t : S → R to 2, where
t(s) is the monetary transfer from 2 to 1 if state s is realized. Of course, 1’s take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer to 2 will have to satisfy a participation constraint for 2 which will be
speciﬁed shortly.
The coinsurance problem we have just described is a completely standard one.
Since in (1) we have speciﬁed the agents utilities so that complete insurance is in
fact feasible, in the absence of any additional restrictions, the optimal contract t∗ will




tZ if s ∈ Z
tZ if s ∈ Z
(2)Undescribable Events 9
and 1 + tZ = tZ so that ∀ s ∈ S
U1(t(s),s) = V (1 + tZ) = V (tZ) and U2(t(s),s) = V (−tZ) = V (1 − tZ) (3)
Agent 2’s participation constraint can be easily speciﬁed if we deﬁne the proba-
bility p = Pr{s ∈ Z} that s falls in Z. In the absence of any agreed transfers 2’s
expected utility is pV (0)+(1−p)V (1). Since 2 is the recipient of a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, his participation constraint will bind. Therefore, in addition to (3) the optimal
contract t∗ is characterized by
pV (−tZ) + (1 − p)V (1 − tZ) = pV (0) + (1 − p)V (1) (4)
Clearly, equation (3) and (4) uniquely pin down the values of tZ and tZ, so that
the characterization of the solution to our coinsurance problem in the standard case
is complete.
Starting with Hart and Moore (1988) a class of models that fall within the fol-
lowing broad sketch has become somewhat canonical in the incomplete contracting
literature.11 Two contracting parties, a buyer and a seller, have the opportunity to
undertake an ex-ante unobservable relationship-speciﬁc investment that aﬀects the
cost and/or value of the object (a “widget”) of the potential exchange. Subsequently,
the cost and value of the widget are realized, typically as a function of the realization
of a state of nature as well as of the levels of relationship-speciﬁc investment. The
presence of non-contractible variables in this set-up then gives rise to a hold-up prob-
lem, which in turn determines ineﬃcient levels of ex-ante investments. In particular
the ex-ante investments, the actual cost and value of the widget and the state of
nature cannot be directly contracted on, even though it would be advantageous in
principle to write an ex-ante contract that conditions the sale price of the widget (and
11What follows is not meant to be a summary description of the actual model analyzed in Hart
and Moore (1988), but merely a description of the main ingredients common to many contributions
to this area of the literature. We also refer the reader to our discussion of related literature in
Section 9 below.Undescribable Events 10
possibly whether the exchange is to take place or not) on these variables.
Our results below could be applied, virtually unchanged, to yield a model of the
type we have just outlined in which one or more of the relevant variables cannot
be proﬁtably included in an ex-ante contract because the relevant events are too
complex. We use the coinsurance problem above as a backdrop purely for the sake of
its simplicity.
4. States and Probabilities
4.1. The State Space
We begin with a formal deﬁnition of our state space.
Deﬁnition 1. State Space: The state space S is a countably inﬁnite set {s1, s2,




n ∈ {0,1} for every i and n.
Some comments are in order. As we mentioned above, each digit si
n of a given




These features should be interpreted as elementary in a well deﬁned sense. They
should not include sub-statements that preclude a feature from being true or false
in conjunction with the truth or falsity of other elementary features. For instance,
suppose that the physical possibilities limit the amount of rainfall (say in a 24-hour
period) to be r ∈ {0,1,2,3} inches. The description of the state embodied in its
features should specify the amount of rainfall. If we interpret, say feature 1 as “it
rained at least 1 inch” and feature 2 as “it rained at least 2 inches” it is clear that any
state in which feature 1 is false and feature 2 is true is not well deﬁned. The elementary
features, say features 1 and 2, describing rainfall should instead be interpreted as
12It is easy to check that our analysis generalizes easily to a model in which each elementary feature
can take a ﬁnite number of values instead of just two. The ﬂavor of what we say also generalizes
to the case in which the value of each feature lives in a well-behaved space (for instance a compact
subset of a complete separable metric space). See also footnote 7 above.Undescribable Events 11
follows. Feature 1 is “the ﬁrst digit of the binary expansion of the amount of rainfall
in inches equals 1” and feature 2 is “the second digit of the binary expansion of the
amount of rainfall in inches equals 1” so that all four combinations of true and false
of the two features are logically consistent in principle.
The rainfall example takes us directly to a second concern.13 Clearly, the car-
dinality of the set C of all possible sequences of the type {s1
n,...,si
n,...} is that of
the continuum, 2ℵ0. However, Deﬁnition 1 requires S to be a countable set.14 A
legitimate question to ask is then whether this imposes a hidden structure on the
relationship between features. Some combinations of elementary features do not lead
to a well deﬁned state in S; some sentences consisting of elementary features are ruled
out of the state space S.
Recall, however, that our emphasis here is on what can be described by means
of any ﬁnite sentence in the language provided by the elementary features. This is
what ﬁnite contracts are limited to do. The set of ﬁnite sentences in our language is
easily seen to be countable. As will be apparent below our results hold for a state
space S in which no ﬁnite sentences are ruled out.15 It is possible to go from the set
C of all possible (ﬁnite and inﬁnite) sentences in the language to our countable state
space S, with only inﬁnite sentences being ruled out. Finally, nothing in our model
forbids “correlation” between features in the structure of S. This correlation could
be suﬃciently strong so that some ﬁnite sentences are in fact ruled out, but it is not
necessary in any way.
4.2. Probabilities
The probability measure µ that we place over S is unconventional. We deﬁne the
density of a set of states.
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
14As we discuss at some length in Section 10 below a state space S that is a “small” subset of C
is a necessary ingredient of a model that delivers the results that we obtain here.
15See footnote 20.Undescribable Events 12
Deﬁnition 2. Density: Given any Q ⊆ S, let χQ denote the characteristic function
of Q so that χQ(sn) = 1 if sn ∈ Q and χQ(sn) = 0 if sn 6∈ Q. We deﬁne the density








when the limit in (5) exists. The density is otherwise left undeﬁned. We denote by
D the collection of subsets of S that have a well deﬁned density.
Two points should be noted. First, the density of a set µ(Q) is its “frequency”
in the standard sense of the word. Thus, for instance, every ﬁnite set of states has a
density of zero, the set of all “even numbered” states {s2,s4,s6,...} has a density of
1/2, and so on. Second, the density of a set (and whether or not it is well deﬁned)
depends on the ordering of the states {s1,...,sn,...}.16 This ordering is taken as
given and ﬁxed throughout the paper.
We conclude this subsection with three observations that will become useful below.
First, given two sets Q0 and Q00 that have well deﬁned densities and such that
µ(Q0) > 0 and µ(Q0 ∩ Q00) is also well deﬁned, we can deﬁne the conditional density
µ(Q00 | Q0) as µ(Q0 ∩ Q00)/µ(Q0).
Secondly, if we let Σ be the set of all subsets of S, then there exists an extension
to Σ of the density µ in Deﬁnition 2 above which is a ﬁnitely additive probability
measure. In other words, there exists a ﬁnitely additive probability measure ˜ µ over
(S,Σ) that for every set of states B ⊂ S satisﬁes ˜ µ(B) = µ(B), whenever µ(B) is
deﬁned.17
Lastly, we note that while µ of Deﬁnition 2 (and hence ˜ µ) obeys ﬁnite additivity
it fails to be countably additive. Recall that for any singleton set sn ∈ S we have that
µ(sn) = 0. Clearly, this implies that
P∞
n=1 µ(sn) = 0. However, S =
S∞
n=1 sn and
16Since the probability of events in D is implicitly assumed to be common knowledge among the
contracting parties, we are also implicitly assuming that the enumeration of states is the same for
the two agents.
17See, for example, Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983, p. 41) for a proof.Undescribable Events 13
µ(S) = 1. We return at some length to the speciﬁc role that the failure of countable
additivity plays in our context in Sections 9 and 10 below.
Probabilities that obey ﬁnite additivity but fail to be countably additive are cer-
tainly not new in statistical and decision theory. For instance, the classic work by
Savage (1954) only introduces countable additivity as a “special hypothesis” if and
when needed.18 The classical arguments to consider a postulate of countable ad-
ditivity something that should be dispensed with if at all possible are well known
(de Finetti 1949, Dubins and Savage 1976). We do not pursue them any further here.
5. Finitely Deﬁnable Sets and Finite Contracts
The set of ex-ante contracts that our agents can draw up intuitively coincides with
those agreements that can be embodied into ﬁnite statements in the language at
their disposal. It is convenient to start our description of what a ﬁnite contract is by
introducing the notion of a ﬁnitely deﬁnable set. Intuitively, these are subsets of S
that can be deﬁned referring only to a ﬁnite subset of their features.
Recall that for each state of nature sn, the digit si
n ∈ {0,1} indicates the value of
the i-th. Deﬁne also
A(i,j) = {sn ∈ S such that s
i
n = j} (6)
so that A(i,j) is the set of states that have the i-th feature equal to j ∈ {0,1}.
These are the elementary statements of the underlying language to which we referred
informally in Subsections 1.2 and 4.1 above.
We are now ready to deﬁne the ﬁnitely deﬁnable subsets of S. These are the sets
that can be described in the language of our contracting parties.
Deﬁnition 3. Finitely Deﬁnable Sets: Consider the algebra of subsets of S gener-
ated by the collection of sets of the type A(i,j) deﬁned in (6). Let this algebra be
denoted by A. We refer to any A ∈ A as a ﬁnitely deﬁnable set.
18See also the fundamental contributions in de Finetti (1937), Koopman (1940a), Koopman
(1940b) and Koopman (1941).Undescribable Events 14
Elements of A can be obtained by complements and/or ﬁnite intersections and/or
ﬁnite unions of the sets A(i,j). Hence every element of A can be deﬁned by ﬁnitely
many elementary statements about the features of the states of nature that it contains.
A suitable deﬁnition of a ﬁnite contract is now possible. The key feature of a ﬁnite
contract is that it should specify a set of transfers that is conditional only on ﬁnitely
deﬁnable sets. For simplicity we also restrict attention to contracts that specify a
ﬁnite set of values for the actual transfer t. This is clearly without loss of generality
in our simple coinsurance problem described in Section 3 above.
Deﬁnition 4. Finite Contracts: A contract is ﬁnite if and only if the transfer rule
t(·) that it prescribes is measurable with respect to A, and takes ﬁnitely many values
{t1,...,tM}. The set of ﬁnite contracts is denoted by F.
While it is possible, as we do here, to take Deﬁnition 4 as a primitive that embodies
the notion of a contract as a ﬁnite object, it is important to point out that this
requirement can be supported in a diﬀerent way (other than just taking Deﬁnition 4
at face value).
Anderlini and Felli (1994) put forward the idea that it is natural to consider
contracts that yield a value for a sharing rule that is computable by a Turing machine
as a function of the state of nature. The justiﬁcation for this requirement is a claim
that if a function is computable in a ﬁnite number of steps by any imaginable ﬁnite
device then it must be computable by a Turing machine.19 Obviously, any ﬁnite
contract must be computable. It is also possible to show that the converse holds:
requiring that contracts be ﬁnite exhausts the set of all computable contracts. For
reasons of space, we omit any formal analysis of this topic.
6. Expected Utilities
Recall that it is our goal to restrict attention to those cases in which the agents can
base their choices on the expected utility that an ex-ante contract yields. Since we
19This claim is known in the literature on computable functions as Church’s thesis. See for instance
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want the agents to be able to contemplate all possible ﬁnite contracts, we need to
ensure that all such contracts can be evaluated in this way. So far, there is nothing in
our framework that guarantees that this is the case. This is because our Deﬁnition 2
above does not, by itself, guarantee that all ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets have a well deﬁned
density. Proposition 1 below guarantees that this can indeed be done.
Before the formal result, it is convenient to state a formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. Finitely Consistent State Space: We say that a state space S as in
Deﬁnition 1 is ﬁnitely consistent if it is the case that A ⊆ D so that every A ∈ A has
a well deﬁned density µ(A).
We are now ready for our ﬁrst claim.
Proposition 1. Existence: There exists a state space S as in Deﬁnition 1 that is
ﬁnitely consistent according to Deﬁnition 5.20
The proof of the Proposition is in the Appendix. One way to construct the S
of Proposition 1 is to take the state space as a realization of countably many i.i.d.
draws from a countably additive density ˆ µ over C = {0,1}N (the proof in the Appendix
runs along these lines). It is then suﬃcient to observe that the law of large numbers
guarantees that, with probability one, the limit frequency of draws that fall into any
ﬁnitely deﬁnable set A is in fact well deﬁned and equal to its density ˆ µ(A). The set of
realizations of these i.i.d. draws that have the properties required by the statement
of the proposition has probability one in the space of realizations of this process. It
then follows that it must be nonempty. Hence, setting S to be equal to a “typical”
realization of these i.i.d. draws as described is suﬃcient to prove the claim.
To evaluate the expected utility accruing to each party from any ﬁnite contract
we will also need to refer to the conditional densities of certain events. This is an
easy task if we restrict attention to ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. The following remark is
20Moreover, as is readily apparent from the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, the ﬁnitely
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stated without proof since it is a direct consequence of the fact that, by assumption,
since A is an algebra, the intersection of two ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets is itself ﬁnitely
deﬁnable.
Remark 1. Well Deﬁned Conditional Densities: Let S be a ﬁnitely consistent state
space. Let A0 and A00 be two ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets with µ(A0) > 0. Then the
conditional density µ(A00 | A0) is well deﬁned.
Of course, to compute the expected utility of ﬁnite contracts, the parties must be
able to compute more than the frequencies of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. They need to
compute the density of the intersection of Z with any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set.
Our next deﬁnition makes precise what it means for a set of states to meet this
requirement.
Deﬁnition 6. Well-Deﬁned Conditional Frequencies: A set Z has well-deﬁned con-
ditional frequencies if
Z ∩ A ∈ D ∀ A ∈ A
In other words Z has a well deﬁned density, conditional on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set
that has positive measure under µ.
The fact that undescribable events with well-deﬁned conditional frequencies can
arise in this model is the subject of our next section. For the time being, we remark
that the expected utilities from any ﬁnite contract are well deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 7. Expected Utilities: Consider the coinsurance problem described in Se-
ction 3. Let µ be the density of Deﬁnition 2, and let S be a ﬁnitely consistent state
space. Assume further that Z has well deﬁned conditional frequencies in the sense
of Deﬁnition 6. Let also any ﬁnite contract t : S → {t1,...,tM} be given. Then the
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In this paper, we restrict attention to contracts that are measurable with respect
to A and to contracting problems in which Z has well deﬁned conditional frequencies
in the sense of Deﬁnition 6. This ensures that expected utility has the simple form
above. To deal with more general settings, an elaborate theory of integration with
respect to ﬁnitely additive probabilities is available.21
7. Undescribable Events
We begin with an abstract deﬁnition that captures the idea that in the model we have
set up it is possible that a set Z may look the same if we consider its restriction over
any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set, but at the same time may have a characteristic function
that varies ﬁnely with the state of nature. It will be precisely this type of variability
that ﬁnite contracts cannot capture and hence gives rise to undescribable events.
Deﬁnition 8. Undescribability: We say that an event Z ⊆ S is undescribable if
µ(Z) ∈ (0,1) and
µ(Z|A) = µ(Z) ∀A ∈ A with µ(A) > 0. (9)
So, Z is undescribable if its density is deﬁned and is neither zero nor one, and its
conditional density is deﬁned and is the same, conditional on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable
set that has positive measure under µ.22
21Dunford and Schwartz (1958) is a classic textbook which provides a uniﬁed treatment of inte-
gration for both ﬁnite and countably additive measures. A more specialized treatment can be found
in Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983).
22Notice that if Z is undescribable, it follows from our deﬁnition that it has well deﬁned conditional
frequencies according to Deﬁnition 6. We are only interested in undescribable events that have well
deﬁned conditional frequencies because we seek a deﬁnition of such events that allows all relevant
expected utility calculations to be carried out — see the ﬁrst of our Desiderata (1.Expected Utility)
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In other words, if Z is undescribable knowing that s belongs to any ﬁnitely de-
ﬁnable subset of S does not help us to predict better whether it belongs to Z or to
its complement: any “ﬁnite” piece of information about s has no value to this end.
It should be noted at this point that the possibility that Deﬁnition 8 may have a
non-trivial content is a feature of the model we have set up, which does not hold in
say a standard model with a continuum of states with Z a measurable set. In fact, it
is clear that in this case if Z satisﬁes (9) then it must have measure either 0 or 1.23
This is not the case in our model.
Proposition 2. Undescribable Events: There exits a ﬁnitely consistent state space S
such that, for every p ∈ (0,1), there is an undescribable event Z ⊂ S with µ(Z) = p.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Here we only sketch the
argument for the case p = 1/2. Let S be a ﬁnitely consistent state space. We can
then construct Z in the following way. For each given state of nature sn ∈ S we set
sn ∈ Z and sn ∈ Z with equal probability, and with i.i.d. draws across all the states
sn. The law of large numbers again guarantees that we can take Z to be a “typical”
realization of this process to prove the claim. In fact, in any such typical realization,
the law of large numbers ensures that the event Z has a density that is well deﬁned
and is equal to 1/2 conditional on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable subset of states. In other
words, the event Z is undescribable.
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 reported in the Appendix both rely on the
law of large numbers. An advantage of these arguments is that the resulting state
spaces and undescribable events are not knife-edge constructs, but probability-one
realizations of the stochastic processes used. However, it is legitimate at this point
to ask whether there are constructive arguments that can be used instead.
The answer to the question is aﬃrmative. In fact, the following construction
proves both Propositions 1 and 2. We outline it for the case in which µ(A(i,j)) =
23Observe that if Z 6= ∅ and we are allowed to take A ⊆ Z, using (9) we trivially get that 1 =
µ(Z|A) = µ(Z). We return to the lack of undescribable events in the standard set-up in Subsection
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1/2 for every i and every j, and µ(Z) = 1/2.
Start with the states being identiﬁed by their labels, the positive integers. Now
assign all odd numbered states (s1, s3, s5, s7, s9, s11,...) to Z and all even numbered
states (s2, s4, s6, s8, s10, s12,...) to Z. The features of each state in Z can be though
of as forming a column of an inﬁnite matrix M(Z) with columns labeled s1, s3, s5,
s7, s9, s11,... Similarly the features of each state in Z can be thought of as forming
a column of an inﬁnite matrix M(Z) with columns labeled s2, s4, s6, s8, s10, s12,...
Now assign the values of the features of states in Z proceeding by row of the
matrix M(Z) as follows. In the ﬁrst row assign 0 to the ﬁrst element (so that s1
1 = 0),
assign 1 to the second element (so that s1
3 = 1) and continue ad inﬁnitum alternating
each time a 0 and a 1. In the second row assign a value of 0 to the ﬁrst two elements
(so that s2
1 = s2
3 = 0), the a value of 1 to the next two elements (so that s2
5 = s2
7 = 0)
and continue ad inﬁnitum alternating two 0s and two 1s along the row. In the third




7 = 0) and




15 = 1) and continue
ad inﬁnitum alternating four 0s and four 1s along the row. In the m-th row of M(Z)
assign a value of 0 to the ﬁrst 2m−1 elements, a value of 0 to the next 2m−1 elements
and so on ad inﬁnitum to ﬁll the entire matrix.
To assign the values of the features of states in Z, ﬁll out the entries of the matrix
M(Z) by reversing the assignment for M(Z): in every position of M(Z) place a 1
if a 0 appears in the corresponding position in M(Z), and a 0 if a 1 appears in the
corresponding position in M(Z). A schematic representation of the construction weUndescribable Events 20
have outlined is as follows.
M(Z) M(Z)
z }| {
s1 s3 s5 s7 s9 s11 ···
0 1 0 1 0 1 ···
0 0 1 1 0 0 ···
0 0 0 0 1 1 ···






. . . ...
z }| {
s2 s4 s6 s8 s10 s12 ...
1 0 1 0 1 0 ···
1 1 0 0 1 1 ···
1 1 1 1 0 0 ···






. . . ...
It then becomes easy to verify that all the requirements of Propositions 1 and 2
are satisﬁed with µ(A(i,j)) = 1/2 for every i and every j, and µ(Z) = 1/2.
While the constructive argument we have outlined clears one concern, it raises
a new one that is worth addressing at this point. It may be tempting to argue
that the set Z that we constructed above is not complex, and that it is (obviously)
describable—after all, the construction we outlined is its description. We believe this
to be misleading, however. To appreciate this point, let N be the set of natural num-
bers and ﬁx any countable state space S. Call a function e : N → S an enumeration if
it is one-to-one and onto (thus, under e, we are labeling a state s ∈ S as the e−1(s)-th
state). Given any inﬁnite subset Z ⊂ S, it is obviously possible to ﬁnd an enumera-
tion eZ under which Z has a simple description. For instance, one can easily ﬁnd an
eZ under which Z corresponds to (i.e. e
−1
Z (Z) is) the set of even integers. Obviously
Z is simple to describe, but only given the enumeration eZ.
To use the labels in N given by e to identify a set, the description of a set must
therefore include a full speciﬁcation of the enumeration needed to give it a simple
representation (e.g. as the set of even integers) — an inﬁnite object by itself. The
contracting agents in our model are endowed with a given language: the set of all
possible ﬁnite sentences combining a ﬁxed set of elementary features. This language
is the only available vehicle to convey their will to the court. Thus, permutations of
the integer labels of the states are meaningless to our contracting agents in identifyingUndescribable Events 21
any particular set of states in an ex-ante contract. The set Z constructed above is
not describable in the language determined by the elementary features.
8. Coinsurance With Undescribable Events
8.1. No Coinsurance
The possibility that the contract t∗ in the coinsurance problem described in Section 3
above may prescribe transfers conditional on an undescribable event has far reaching
consequences on what the contracting parties can achieve by means of a ﬁnite contract.
In this case, any ﬁnite contract will be unable to capture any of the ﬁne variability
of t∗. As a consequence the agents will choose a trivial contract that prescribes a
transfer of t = 0 in every possible state. This is of course the same as saying that no
contract will be drawn up.
Consider the coinsurance problem described in Section 3. For a given S, µ and
Z, let t∗∗ be the optimal ﬁnite coinsurance contract, if it exists. In other words, if it
is well deﬁned let t∗∗ be the solution to
max
t EU1(t)
s.t. EU2(t) ≥ µ(Z)V (0) + µ(Z)V (1)
t ∈ F
(10)
where EUi(t) are the parties’ expected utilities as in Deﬁnition 7 above.
Proposition 3. Optimal No Coinsurance: Consider the coinsurance problem desc-
ribed in Section 3. Then there exist an S, µ and Z with µ(Z) ∈ (0,1) with the
following properties.
1. The set Z has well deﬁned conditional frequencies.
2. The optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (10) exists and is unique, up
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3. The optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ prescribes no transfer between the agents in every
state of nature. In other words t∗∗(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S, up to a set of states of
µ-measure zero.
Once again the formal proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. Intuitively,
Proposition 3 is a fairly direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 coupled with the
concavity of the agents’ preferences.
Start with a ﬁnitely consistent state space S. Recall now that in the coinsur-
ance problem described in Section 3 the parties are able to achieve full insurance by
agreeing on a transfer contingent on the event Z. We now choose the event Z to
be undescribable as in Proposition 2. Let pZ and pZ be the densities of Z and Z
respectively, conditional on any A ∈ A.
Since Z is undescribable any attempt by the parties to condition on a ﬁnite set
of characteristics (the only feasible ex-ante description available to them) will leave
them with a set of states of which only a fraction pZ actually belongs to Z. This
is true whatever ﬁnitely deﬁnable subset of S the parties decide to condition their
contract on. The fact that the parties are risk averse now implies that the optimal
ﬁnite contract should specify the same transfer from 2 to 1 contingent on any ﬁnitely
deﬁnable subset of S. Any transfer function that varies across two ﬁnitely deﬁnable
sets of states will be strictly dominated (in terms of the parties expected utility) by a
constant transfer that coincides with the average of the transfer function we started
from.
The optimal contract t∗∗ is now obtained from the observation that the only con-
stant (across all states) transfers from 2 to 1 that are compatible with 2’s participation
constraint are non-positive. Since 1’s expected utility is increasing in the constant
transfer from 2, the optimal ﬁnite contract must clearly prescribe a transfer of 0 in
all states.
The allocation entailed by the optimal ﬁnite contract coincides with the no-
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risk averse implies that party 1’s expected utility associated with the no-contract
outcome is bounded away from the full-insurance contract t∗ described in Section 3.
The extreme prediction that the parties will choose an allocation equivalent to
no-contract at all of course derives from the particular event Z. An example of a less
extreme situation is our next concern.
8.2. Some Coinsurance
By way of motivation, consider again our “tenurable vitae” example in the Introduc-
tion to the paper. Clearly, the extreme situation described above in which the null
contract obtains is not fully suited to this case.
For simplicity, imagine a case in which there is one journal that matters at all.
For simplicity again, assume that the candidate can only possibly publish either 0
or 1 paper in this journal by the time the case is reviewed, and that the number of
papers published in this journal is described by the value of the ﬁrst feature of s ∈
S. Clearly, knowing whether the candidate has a journal publication or not (knowing
the ﬁrst feature of s) is not irrelevant to whether the candidate has a tenurable vitae.
In the spirit of our remarks in the Introduction to the paper, we now imagine that
although the value of the ﬁrst feature is important in the tenure decision, it does not
seal the case either way. The event that the candidate has a tenurable vitae is too
complex. Some vitae with no journal publications are tenurable while some are not.
Some vitae with a journal publication are tenurable while some are not. Knowing
that the candidate has a journal publication makes it more likely that she deserves
tenure. The example that follows is designed to show that our set up can easily
capture intermediate situations of this kind.24
We partition the state space S into two subsets: A0 = A(1,0) in which Z is more
likely, and A1 = A(1,1) in which it is less likely.25 In fact with a simple adaptation
24The example is deliberately kept as simple as possible. It is immediate to see how it generalizes
to the case of a ﬁnite set of relevant conditioning events. As we outline in Section 10 below, much
more far-reaching generalizations are possible, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
25Note that, using the deﬁnition of A(i,j) given in (6), A0 is the set of states in which the ﬁrst
feature is equal to 0, while A1 is the set of states in which it is equal to one.Undescribable Events 24
of the argument used to prove Proposition 2 we can pick two numbers p < p in (0,1)
and ensure that Z is such that for any A ∈ A
µ(Z|A) =
(
p if A ⊆ A0
p if A ⊆ A1
(11)
A simple adaptation of the argument used to prove Proposition 3 is now suﬃcient




t0 if s ∈ A0
t1 if s ∈ A1
(12)
with t1 < t0.
Intuitively, the two agents face two sources of uncertainty. These are the two
events s ∈ A0 as opposed to s ∈ A1, and s ∈ Z as opposed to s ∈ Z. The ﬁrst event
is insurable since A0 and A1 are ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. Because of the undescribability
of Z relative to A0 and A1, the second cannot be usefully captured by a ﬁnite contract,
except for the fact that it is correlated with the ﬁrst. The optimal coinsurance contract
between the agents then exhibits partial insurance against the event s ∈ A0 as opposed
to s ∈ A1.
9. Related Literature
As we have discussed already, the intuitive notion of an event that is impossible to
include in an ex-ante contract because it is too complex has been extensively used in
the incomplete contracting literature.26 Here, we restrict ourselves to some related
papers that we have not discussed before.
Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar (1999) are two existing contributions that
are closely related to the results presented here. In Anderlini and Felli (1994), the
26This line of research has proved extremely fertile. Among other things, it has aﬀorded important
insights concerning the boundaries of a ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart 1986), the allocation of ownership
rights over physical assets (Hart and Moore 1990), the allocation of authority (Aghion and Tirole
1997) and power (Rajan and Zingales 1998) in organizations.Undescribable Events 25
contracting parties are restricted to ex-ante agreements that are ﬁnite in a sense that
is analogous to the one we postulate in this paper. However, crucially, in Anderlini
and Felli (1994), there is a continuum of states of nature. One of the results reported
there is the so-called “approximation result:” in a model with a continuum of states,
under general conditions of continuity, the restriction that only ﬁnitely many of the
constituent features of a state of nature can be included in any ex-ante agreement
has a negligible impact on the parties’ expected utilities.
The restriction to ﬁnite agreements clearly precludes the agents from writing some
possible ex-ante contracts.27 Intuitively, the reason why the impact of this restriction
is in fact negligible lies in the requirement that the parties must be able to compute
the expected utilities that an ex-ante agreement generates. If an ex-ante agreement
yields well deﬁned expected utilities to the contracting parties, then it must yield
them utility levels that are integrable (in the standard sense) as a function of the
state of nature. Since a function that is integrable can always be approximated
by a sequence of step functions, it is now enough to notice that (a suﬃciently rich
set of) step functions can be viewed as ﬁnite ex-ante agreements. In the model
studied in Anderlini and Felli (1994), a “rich language” is suﬃcient to generate the
approximation result that instead fails to hold in this paper.
Intuitively the diﬀerence between the two environments can be traced to the cardi-
nality of the state space (countable versus continuous) and the nature of the associated
probability measure (ﬁnitely additive frequencies in this paper, standard probability
measures over the interval [0,1] in Anderlini and Felli (1994)).28
Using techniques similar to the ones used here, Al-Najjar (1999) addresses the
question of whether competitive diﬀerences between agents get washed out by imi-
tation. In a model with a continuum of states it is possible to show that the per-
formance of a successful agent can be replicated asymptotically as more and more
27A simple counting argument suﬃces to prove this point. It is easy to see that in the world of
Anderlini and Felli (1994) there are countably many possible ﬁnite ex-ante contracts, while there
are uncountably many possible ex-ante agreements.
28We return to the approximation result of Anderlini and Felli (1994) in Subsection 10.2.Undescribable Events 26
data become available: a version of the approximation result described above holds
in this case. However, in a complex environment, imitation does not eliminate all
competitive advantages, even in the limit when an arbitrarily large amount of data
becomes available.29
The approach taken in Al-Najjar, Casadesus-Masanell, and Ozdenoren (2003) to
modeling complexity and undescribability is conceptually and technically diﬀerent
from what we do here. As in the present paper, the overarching idea is the discon-
tinuity between the diﬃcult task of formulating ex-ante rules for dealing with all
instances of a decision problem vs. the relative ease of picking the right action once
a particular instance of the problem is realized. In their paper, the decision-maker’s
inability to think through all instances in advance is modeled as a subjective proba-
bilistic model reﬂecting his ex-ante cognitive uncertainty about what will be revealed
ex-post.
Finally, we view this paper as orthogonal to the debate on the role of message
games in incomplete contracting models. In particular, a number of authors have
argued that message games can in fact substitute for complete ex-ante contracting.30
The contracting parties play an ex-post message game in which their private informa-
tion is revealed in equilibrium. This enables them to make the contractual outcome
depend on events that the ex-ante contract neglects. As we have stressed already, our
contribution here is to model undescribable events that cannot feature in an ex-ante
contract. If these are present, then the type of message game that is appropriate to
the environment at hand will be the parties only hope to condition on the events that
they cannot specify directly in their ex-ante agreement.
29In a paper subsequent to the present one Al-Najjar and Casadesus-Masanell (2002) apply a
similar construction to the one used here to a principal-agent model. The incomplete agency contract
that results may leave a role for trust and for agent discretion in their agreement.
30See Tirole (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), Segal (1999), Hart and Moore (1999), Reiche (2004)
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10. Conclusions and Further Results
We have shown that it is possible to construct a contracting environment in which
some events have the following properties. Their probabilities and consequences are
understood by all concerned, and all agents involved use this information to calculate
expected utilities arising from any possible ﬁnite ex-ante contract. Yet these events
are undescribable in the sense that any attempt to capture them by means of a ﬁnite
ex-ante agreement must fail.
The contracting parties cannot describe these events to any degree that will im-
prove their expected utilities relative to an agreement that ignores them altogether.
This is so notwithstanding the fact that the contracting parties’ language can in fact
distinguish between any two states.
10.1. Intermediate Cases
As our example in Subsection 8.2 shows, it is possible to envision intermediate cases
in which, say, knowing that the ﬁrst feature of a state is 0 tells us something about its
membership of Z, but it is still the case that Z cannot be approximated by a ﬁnite
contract.
In an earlier version of this paper (Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli 2002) we develop
formally a batch of results that deal with a much larger class of these intermediate
cases. What follows is a brief sketch.
It is possible to characterize tightly what the optimal ﬁnite contract looks like in
the general case in which the conditional density of Z is not equal across all ﬁnitely
deﬁnable sets in the algebra A. Applying a theorem by Kolmogorov,31 we can identify
the unique countably additive measure on the set C = {0,1}N that agrees with the
conditional density of Z, µ(Z|·), on every A in A.32 Using this measure and keeping
ﬁxed the parties’ utility functions we can then deﬁne an auxiliary contracting problem
on the state space C.
31See for instance Billingsley (1995, Theorem 2.3) or Doob (1994, Theorem V.6)
32In the extreme case addressed by Proposition 3 this would be the uniform measure on C.Undescribable Events 28
Since the ingredients of the auxiliary contracting problem are all standard it can
be solved using familiar techniques. It is then possible to show that the solution to
the auxiliary problem fully characterizes the optimal ﬁnite contract in the general
case.
Hence the optimal ﬁnite contract is not null in the general case. It captures
the variability of the conditional density of Z that can be embodied in its unique
countably additive translation to C that we have mentioned above.
All other variability in the characteristic function of Z cannot be captured at all
by any ﬁnite contract. Hence it can be safely ignored in the characterization of the
optimal ﬁnite contract that the parties will sign.
10.2. Necessity
Our last concern is to revisit the unconventional features of our model of undescribable
events. There are two that stand out. First, the measure µ that we place on S is
ﬁnitely additive but, as we remarked above, fails to be countably additive. Second,
our state space S is a “small” (countable) subset of the set C = {0,1}N of all logically
conceivable states.
In an earlier version of this paper (Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli 2003) we demon-
strate that both unconventional features of our model are necessary ingredients of a
model that delivers our results.
Broadly speaking, in Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli (2003) we show that given
any state space S equipped with a countably additive measure the approximation
result of Anderlini and Felli (1994) must hold. That is, any set in the σ-algebra on
which the countably additive measure is deﬁned can be approximated more and more
closely by a sequence of sets in the algebra (not the σ-algebra) on which the measure
is deﬁned. Hence no undescribable events in the sense of Deﬁnition 8 can be found
in this case. Although the details of the argument are relatively involved, the claim
is a reasonably direct consequence of the deﬁnition of countable additivity and of
Carath´ eodory’s Extension Theorem.33Undescribable Events 29
In a nutshell, in Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli (2003) we also show that if a
state space S ⊆ C = {0,1}N equipped with a measure µ admits an undescribable
event as in Deﬁnition 8 then S must be a small subset of C in a well deﬁned sense.34
The argument behind this claim utilizes again the theorem by Kolmogorov we cited
above.35 Very roughly speaking this guarantees that if S were to contain a whole
“cylinder” of C then any measure placed on S that is ﬁnitely additive would also have
to satisfy countable additivity on the same subset of C. This in turn would contradict
the result described in the paragraph above.
We view the necessity claims we have just outlined as indicating that the results
in this paper can in fact be read in two ways. The ﬁrst is to conclude that it is indeed
possible to model formally the notion of an undescribable event. The second is that
the model we used to this end, complete with its unconventional features, is what it
takes to get a formal hold of this notion. There is a sense in which a rejection of the
unconventional ingredients that we use here is equivalent to saying that the formal
notion of an event that is undescribable because it is too complex rather than because
the parties do not have a suﬃciently rich language is unattainable.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the set C of inﬁnite sequences of 0s and 1s, C = {0,1}N, with
typical element c and let ci be the i-th digit of the sequence c. Let also
˜ A(i,j) = {c ∈ C such that ci = j} (A.1)
Let H denote the set of all inﬁnite sequences {c1,...,cn,...} with cn ∈ C for every n. Let
{˜ cn}∞
n=1 be an inﬁnite sequence of i.i.d. random variables with (countably additive) distribution ˜ µ
over C, and let P be the (product) probability distribution that this yields for H.
33See, for instance, Royden (1988, Ch. 12.2).
34To be precise, there we show that S must have Lebesgue measure 0 (appropriately translated)
in C. Other notions of “smallness” may be considered as well. Depending on whether one takes the
point of view of the contracting agents or that of the analyst, one notion may be more appropriate
than others. In particular, we conjecture that S is of Baire ﬁrst category in C whenever undescribable
events obtain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
35See footnote 31 above.Undescribable Events 30




n=1 χ ˜ A(i,j)(cn) =







Clearly, since P(M(i,j)) = 1 for every i and j, and of course P is countably additive, we must also
have P(M) = 1, and therefore M 6= ∅.
It is now suﬃcient to choose S to be equal to any element of M to prove the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix any p ∈ (0,1) as in the statement of the proposition. Assume
that S is ﬁnitely consistent, and that it has the property that any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set A contains
a countable inﬁnity of elements. This is clearly possible from the construction in the proof of
Proposition 1.
Deﬁne a stochastic process {˜ h1,...,˜ hn,...} where each random variable ˜ hn takes values in {0,1}.
Let H denote the set of all realizations of this process, and let P be the probability distribution
on H under which {˜ h1,...,˜ hn,...} are i.i.d. random variables with distribution (p,1 − p). Notice
that a realization h = {h1,...,hn ...} ∈ H of this process can be taken to be a candidate for the
characteristic function χZ : S → {0,1}. We now proceed to show that the claim can be proved by
setting χZ equal to any such realization of this process in a set of probability 1.
Let any h ∈ H be given and let A(h) be the set of states sn such that sn ∈ A and hn = 1.
The law of large numbers holds for any A ∈ A in the following sense. There is a set HA ⊂ H with







χA(h)(sn) = p µ(A) (A.3)
Since P(HA) = 1, clearly Q =
T
A∈A HA also has probability 1. Therefore Q 6= ∅. Now select any
element h = {h1,...,hn,...} of Q, and set χZ(sn) = hn for every n. This is our candidate χZ.
Since equation (A.3) holds for any A ∈ A it is obvious that Z is undescribable as in Deﬁnition
8. Again from the fact that equation (A.3) holds for any A ∈ A, it is clear that Z has well deﬁned
conditional frequencies as in Deﬁnition 6. Lastly, again from equation (A.3) it is immediate that for
any A ∈ A with µ(A) > 0 we must have that µ(Z|A) = p, as required.
Lemma A.1: Consider problem (10). Let Z have well deﬁned conditional frequencies as in Deﬁni-
tion 6 and be undescribable as in Deﬁnition 8.Undescribable Events 31
Let any ﬁnite contract t(·) ∈ F that is feasible in problem (10) be given, and {t1,...,tM} be
the range of t(·). Finally, for every i = 1,...,M, let Ti be the inverse image of ti under t(·).
Assume now that t(·) has the following property. There exist an i ∈ {1,...,M} and a j ∈
{1,...,M} such that µ(Ti) > 0 and µ(Tj) > 0. Then there exists another ﬁnite contract t0(·) ∈
F that is constant over Ti ∪ Tj, which is also feasible in problem (10) and which yields a higher
expected utility for agent 1.




∀sn ∈ Ti ∪ Tj (A.4)
The claim now follows directly by concavity of V , deﬁning U1 and U2 as in (1). The rest of the
details are omitted.
Lemma A.2: Let Z have well deﬁned conditional frequencies (as in Deﬁnition 6) and be unde-
scribable (as in Deﬁnition 8). Then an optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (10) exists
unique, up to a set of states of µ-measure zero. Moreover, t∗∗(sn) = 0 for all sn ∈ S, up to a set of
states of µ-measure zero.




V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z)
s.t. V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1 − x)µ(Z) ≥ V (0)µ(Z) + V (1)µ(Z)
x ∈ R
(A.5)
The strict concavity of V (·) implies that problem (A.5) has a unique solution by completely
standard arguments. Let this solution be denoted by ˜ x.
The expected utility V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1 − x)µ(Z) is monotonically decreasing in x. Therefore
the constraint in problem (A.5) is satisﬁed only when x ≤ 0. Since the objective function in problem
(A.5), V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z), is monotonically increasing in x we conclude that the unique
solution of problem (A.5) is ˜ x = 0.
From Lemma A.1 above it is immediate that a solution to problem (A.5) must yield a solution
to problem (10). Therefore setting t∗∗(sn) = 0 for every sn ∈ S yields the unique (up to a set of
µ-measure zero) solution to problem (10).Undescribable Events 32
Proof of Proposition 3: Let S be a ﬁnitely consistent state space. Using Proposition 2 we can
now choose Z to have well deﬁned conditional frequencies, and be undescribable, with µ(Z) ∈ (0,1).
The claim now follows directly from Lemma A.2.
References
Aghion, P., and J. Tirole (1997): “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,”
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1–29.
Al-Najjar, N. I. (1999): “Complexity as a Barrier to Competitive Imitation,” MEDS
Department, Kellogg GSM, Northwestern University, mimeo.
Al-Najjar, N. I., L. Anderlini, and L. Felli (2002): “Unforeseen Contingencies,”
STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/02/431, London School
of Economics.
(2003): “Undescribable Contingencies,” Discussion Paper No 1370, Center
for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern
University.
Al-Najjar, N. I., and R. Casadesus-Masanell (2002): “Trust and Discretion in
Agency Contracts,” MEDS Department, Kellogg GSM, Northwestern University,
mimeo.
Al-Najjar, N. I., R. Casadesus-Masanell, and E. Ozdenoren (2003): “Prob-
abilistic Representation of Complexity,” Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 49–87.
Anderlini, L., and L. Felli (1994): “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable
States of Nature,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1085–1124.
(1999): “Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs,” Theory and Decision,
46, 23–50.
Battigalli, P., and G. Maggi (2002): “Rigidity, Discretion and the Costs of Writing
Contracts,” American Economic Review, 92, 798–817.Undescribable Events 33
Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S., and M. Bhaskara Rao (1983): Theory of Charges. New
York: Academic Press.
Billingsley, P. (1995): Probability and Measure. 3rd edn. New York: John Wiley &
Sons.
Cutland, N. J. (1980): Computability: An Introduction to Recursive Function The-
ory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Finetti, B. (1937): “La Pr´ evision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives,”
Annales de l’Institut Henry Poincar´ e, 7, 1–68.
(1949): “Sull’Impostazione Assiomatica del Calcolo Delle Probabilit` a,” Annali
Triestini, 19, 29–81, Serie 2.
Doob, J. L. (1994): Measure Theory. New-York: Springer-Verlag.
Dubins, L. E., and L. J. Savage (1976): Inequalities for Stochastic Processes (How
to Gamble If You Must). New York: Dover Publications.
Dunford, N., and J. Schwartz (1958): Linear Operators, Part I. New York: Inter-
science.
Dye, R. A. (1985): “Costly Contract Contingencies,” International Economic Review,
26, 233–50.
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Beneﬁts of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94,
691–719.
Hart, O. D., and J. Moore (1988): “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,”
Econometrica, 56, 755–85.
(1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political
Economy, 98, 1119–58.Undescribable Events 34
(1999): “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies,
66, 115–138.
Holmstr¨ om, B. (1982): “Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective,”
in Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki:
Swedish School of Economics.
Koopman, B. (1940a): “The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability,” Annals of
Mathematics, 41, 269–292, Series 2.
(1940b): “The Bases of Probability,” Bulletin of The American Mathematical
Siciety, 46, 763–774.
(1941): “Intuitive Probabilities and Sequences,” Annals of Mathematics, 42,
169–187, Series 2.
Maskin, E. (2002): “On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” Eu-
ropean Economic Review, 46, 725–733.
Maskin, E., and J. Tirole (1999): “Unforseen Contingencies and Incomplete Con-
tracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83 –114.
Moore, J., and R. Repullo (1988): “Subgame Perfect Implementation,” Econo-
metrica, 56, 1191–1220.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales (1998): “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113, 387–432.
Reiche, S. (2004): “Ambivalent Investment and the Hold-Up Problem,” University of
Cambridge, mimeo.
Rogers, H. (1967): Theory of Recursive Functions and Eﬀective Computability. Lon-
don: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Royden, H. L. (1988): Real Analysis. 3rd edn. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company.Undescribable Events 35
Savage, L. J. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics. New-York: Dover Publications.
II Edition, 1972.
Segal, I. (1999): “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Con-
tracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57–82.
Tirole, J. (1999): “Incomplete Contracts: Where do we Stand?,” Econometrica, 67,
741–81.
Woodward, B., and S. Armstrong (1979): The Brethren: Inside the Supreme
Court. New-York: Simon & Schuster.